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RESUMO: Desenvolvemos uma estrutura formal que endogeneiza a estrutura produtiva de 
uma pequena economia periférica aberta como o resultado de um problema de escolhas 
técnicas. Em seguida, examinamos as principais teses teóricas e prescrições políticas da 
abordagem neodesenvolvimentista do desenvolvimento econômico. Argumentamos que: a) 
não apenas o padrão de especialização depende das condições técnicas, mas também da 
distribuição de renda; b) numa economia sem rendas, o nível do rácio do salário nominal-
taxa de câmbio é determinado univocamente quando a taxa de lucros é conhecida e mostra 
uma relação inversa com a mesma; c) se as rendas diferenciais forem consideradas, o nível 
da taxa de lucros pode ser estabelecido independentemente do rácio do salário monetário; 
d) o nível da taxa de câmbio que garante a rentabilidade normal do setor primário não 
precisa coincidir com a taxa de equilíbrio em conta-corrente; e) a taxa de câmbio efetiva 
não precisa gravitar em torno de nenhum desses dois níveis anteriores, que devem ser vistos 
como limiares mínimos da taxa efetiva; f) as consequências distributivas desagradáveis da 
depreciação da taxa de câmbio podem ser parcialmente evitadas por meio de impostos de 
exportação que não elevam os custos de produção de commodities primárias.
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ABSTRAcT: We develop a formal framework that endogeneizes the productive structure of 
a small open peripheral economy as the outcome of a problem of technical choices. We 
subsequently examine the main theoretical theses and policy prescriptions of the New-
Developmentalist approach to economic growth. We argue that: a) not only does the 
pattern of specialization depend on technical conditions, but also on income distribution; 
b) in an economy without rents, the level of the money wage-nominal exchange rate ratio is 
univocally determined once the rate of profits is known, and shows an inverse relationship 
with it; c) if differential rents are considered, the level of the rate of profits can be set 
independently of the money wage-exchange rate ratio; d) the level of the exchange rate that 
ensures normal profitability of the primary sector need not coincide with the current-account 
equilibrium rate; e) the effective exchange rate need not gravitate around any of these two 
former levels, which must be rather seen as minimum thresholds of the effective rate; f) the 
unpleasant distributive consequences of exchange-rate depreciation can be partially avoided 
by means of export duties that do not raise primary-commodities production costs.
KEyWORDS: distributive conflict; Dutch Disease; exchange rate policy; new-
developmentalism; pattern of specialization.
JEl classification: B22; E11; F43.
INTRODUcTION
As is well known, the Neo-Developmentalist Position (henceforth, NDP), 
which has Professor Bresser-Pereira3 as its major proponent, views exchange-rate 
policy as the key variable for sustained economic growth in latin American periph-
eral economies. Inspired in the seminal contribution by lewis (1954), the NDP 
envisages a two-sector economy: on the one hand, there is a sector of primary goods 
(e.g., corn), or inputs of these goods (e.g., oil) – sector c – . Thanks to its “ex-
tremely favourable conditions”, this sector is able to export its production to the 
global markets. On the other hand, there is an industrial sector of consumption 
goods  – sector I – . Even though the latter is a potentially more dynamic industry, 
it is also a relatively backward sector that cannot profitably compete at interna-
tional prices unless the exchange rate is sufficiently high, at its “industrial equilib-
rium” level. Without Government intervention, however, the effective exchange rate 
is argued to gravitate around a lower level, the “current-equilibrium exchange rate”, 
which is the value that is assumed to simultaneously ensure the normal profitabil-
ity of sector c and the equilibrium of the current account. Therefore, this dynamics 
sets an “exchange-rate trap” for industry that prevents its consolidation and future 
expansion, a problem known as “Dutch Disease”. The solution, it is finally claimed, 
consists in introducing a tax on c-production that increases its normal average 
costs and therefore raises the current-equilibrium exchange rate up to the indus-
trial equilibrium level. Although this measure reduces the real wage in the short run, 
3 See Bresser-Pereira (2008, 2012, 2016) among other contributions. See also Oreiro et al. (2015).
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and hence may face the possible resistance of workers, it would be an unavoidable 
cost to boost the development of sector I, which would anyway compensate its 
initial negative consequences in the longer run, through higher job creation and 
average productivity growth. 
The present article attempts to examine the scopes and limits of the NDP, and 
hence must be interpreted as a constructive criticism towards this approach. To this 
end, we develop a formal framework that endogenously determines the pattern of 
specialization of a small-open-peripheral economy as the outcome of a problem of 
technical choices. The main outcomes of our research can be briefly summarized 
in the following six propositions: a) not only does the pattern of specialization of 
the economy depend on technical conditions but also on the distribution of income 
(the rate of profits); b) in an economy without rents, the level of the money wage-
nominal exchange rate ratio is univocally determined once the rate of profits is 
known, and shows an inverse relationship with normal profitability; c) the moment 
differential rents are considered, an additional degree of freedom in the price system 
is gained, and hence the level of the rate of profits can be set independently of the 
money wage-exchange rate ratio; d) the level of the exchange rate that ensures c-
normal profitability need not coincide with the current-account equilibrium rate; 
e) the effective exchange rate need not gravitate around any of these two former 
levels; which, for given levels of autonomous expenditures, must be rather seen as 
minimum thresholds of the effective rate; f) it is possible to avoid the unpleasant 
distributive consequences of exchange-rate depreciation by means of export duties 
that subtract a portion of the differential rent appropriated by landowners, but, 
differently from production taxes, do not raise c-production costs. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the second section presents the 
basic analytical framework, while the third section incorporates the problem of 
differential rent. The fourth section examines the relation among the effective ex-
change rate, the level that ensures c-normal profitability and the current-account 
equilibrium rate. The fifth section addresses the problem of distributive conflict in 
general terms, while the sixth section studies how the issue manifests itself within 
the New-Developmentalist approach, namely as a by-product of the so-called 
Dutch-Disease problem, and it examines its possible solutions. The last section 
resumes the argument and presents the main conclusions of the paper.
ANAlyTIcAl FRAMEWORK4
We conceive a small open economy with persistent unemployment and two 
productive sectors: an industrial sector (I) and a primary sector (c). The sectors 
distinguish themselves by two main features: i) the productive methods employed 
and ii) the destination of production.
4 This framework heavily draws on Dvoskin and Feldman (2017a) and (2017b).
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Regarding the methods of production, it is assumed that sector I is produced 
by labour and an imported capital good, while c requires labour and a fixed factor, 
typically land.5 commodity prices can be represented by the following equations: 
!!! ! !!!!!! !!   [1] 
!!! ! !!!! ! !"!!! !!!! !!  [2]
where !!! ! !!!!!! !!  and !! ! ! !! ! !"!!! !!!! !!  stand respectively, for the supply prices of commodities c and 
I, namely the minimum amount of money per unit of output that producers must 
receive to regularly (under “normal conditions”) deliver each commodity on the 
market. Additionally, w stands for the nominal wage rate, r for the normal rate of 
profits, !!! ! !!!!!! !!  and !! ! !! ! !"!!! !!!! !!  are the unitary labour requirements of sectors c and I, k is the 
unitary requirement of the imported capital good K, !!! ! !!!! ! !"!!! !!!! !!  is its exogenously given 
price in foreign currency and E is the nominal exchange rate.
It is now convenient to introduce a second notion of price, which we shall 
denominate demand or selling price, and that represents the maximum amount of 
money that consumers are willing to pay for a commodity. Since the domestic 
economy takes the international prices of c (!!! ! !!!!  ) and I (!!! ! !!!! ) as given, once the level 
of the exchange rate is fixed, demand prices are univocally determined. Therefore, 
demand prices for commodities c (!!! ! !!!!  ) and I (!!! ! !!!! ) are, respectively: 
!!! ! !!!!     [3]
!!! ! !!!!    [4]
The four equations have seven unknowns: !! !!!!!!! , !!!, !!!, !!! . If we take nomi-
nal wages as given: 
! ! !    [5]
There are still two degrees of freedom left.
Furthermore, at the level of abstraction we are working with, we can safely 
assume free capital mobility across countries. This means that the rate of profits is 
determined by the international rate (r*):
r = r*   [6]6
There is still one degree of freedom left. Before we suggest how to eliminate it, 
let us consider the abovementioned feature ii) of the productive system, i.e., the 
5 For simplicity the analysis abstracts from absolute rent. The role of differential rent will be discussed 
in the third section below. 
6 Notice that in Bresser-Pereira et al. (2014), the assumption of a given rate of profits is obtained though 
a different reasoning, namely, by highlighting the connection between the rate of profits and an exogenously 
given mark-up. however, we keep the specification of the model with equation [6], since in Bresser-Pereira 
et al. (2014) the connection between the domestic rate and the international rate is still missing.
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destinations of production. Note that it is not possible to ascertain which produc-
tive sector will be internationally competitive before the relationship between de-
mand and supply prices of each commodity is established. hence, before income 
distribution is known. Therefore, the pattern of specialization of the economy will 
be regulated by the following conditions: 
!!! ! !!!!! ! !! !    [7]
commodity j is produced and (potentially) exported only if !!! ! !!!!! ! !! !  = !!! ! !!!!! ! ! ! . While if
!!! ! !!!!! ! !! !  < !!! ! !!!!! ! ! ! , sector j will not be viable without protection7. Therefore, we can derive 
for each commodity j an (E/w)-r relation that determines, for each level of r, the 
minimum E/w ratio that allows sector jj to be internationally competitive. (Alter-
natively, for each level of r, we can determine the maximum level of money wages 
in foreign currency, w/E, affordable by each sector. We will return to this second 
interpretation of the curve below.)
For each commodity j=c,I, the level of E that is implied by the E/w ratio is 
obtained by equalizing the respective supply and demand prices. We thus consider 
conditions [1] and [3] for sector c and obtain:
!! ! !!!!!!!!!!!   
  [8]
The level of !! ! !!!!!!!!!!!    is what new-developmentalist authors denominate the “current 
equilibrium” exchange rate (Bresser-Pereira, 2008, pp. 53-55).8
Analogously, for sector I we consider conditions [2] and [4]: 
!! !
!!!!!! !!
!!! ! !!!! !!! !!
   [9]
Where the level EI is what ND authors call the “industrial equilibrium” ex-
change rate (Bresser-Pereira, 2008, p. 53-55)9. Figure 1 (left-hand side) represents 
the shape of these curves: 
7 There is a third possibility, that  !!! ! !!! , which is fulfilled under the presence of differential rent. This 
third case will be explored in the third section below. 
8 Bresser-Pereira (2008, p. 55) formally defines the value EC as the ratio between what he denominates 
the “market price” of c (which is determined by “the marginal cost of the least efficient producer”, and 
hence coincides with !!!  of equation [1]) and the international price of c. It is therefore equivalent to 
the level of E obtained from [8]. 
9 Bresser-Pereira does not offer a formal definition of EI, but he does define the “necessary price” of a 
generic industrial good as “the price that makes economically profitable to produce other tradables 
[other than c] using technology in the state-of-the-art”. It therefore coincides with !!!  in equation [2]. 
And “The ‘industrial’ equilibrium exchange rate [is] the one that enables the production of tradables in 
the country without the need of duties and subsidies […] the exchange rate that, on average, allows 
companies using state-of-the-art technology to be profitable or competitive” (Bresser-Pereira, 2008, p. 
54). This is, in other words, the level of E that arises from condition [9]. 
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Figure 1: E/w – r CURVE
E
w I
C
 
  
I
 
C  ÊI
w
ÊC 
 
r* r  r r*
 
 
 
w
w
-1
-1
-1
E
w
ÊI
w
ÊC
 
w
w
C 
1
C w
EC pC *
  
  
  
  
  CC<0 
CC>0 CC=0 
GG  
w 
E
EEq 
w 
C 
C 
 
w
EC pC *
E 
C 
 
EI 
E  
EC 
w
EC pC *
w
EC pC *
  
I C
C’ 
 r* r  
  
E
w
E
w
EI EC w= =w (
(~
E
w
EC w=
 
C 
E
EI 
E  
EC 
 
 IE
  
B
C 
A 
The curves have two intersections. The first one is at r = –1, while the second 
one is at: 
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  [10]
Figure 1 illustrates the case of 
1+( ) = −ˆ
ˆ
*
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*
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kp
p
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l
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I
C
 > 0. This implies that:
!!
!!
!
!!!
!!! ! !!!!
    [11] 
(We shall interpret below what happens if condition [11] does not hold)
These curves can be used to determine the pattern of specialization of the 
economy. To see this, let us first define the real wage w for a given consumption 
basket (CC; CI) as: 
! ! !
!
 , with  ! ! ! !!!!!!!! !!  , With ! !
!
!
 , with  ! ! !!!!!!!! !!   [12]
Therefore, the real wage w is univocally determined once the level of E/w is 
known, and shows an inverse relationship with the latter. According to a well-
known result of choice of techniques (see Kurz and Salvadori, 1995, ch. 5), all this 
means that the economy will fully specialize in the sector that, given the rate of 
profits r*, can afford the lowest E/w ratio, which is none other than the sector that 
can pay the highest w. Therefore, if r > 
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) the economy will fully specialize 
in the production of industrial goods (primary goods). While, the coexistence of 
the sectors will occur only by a fluke, at r = 
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10.
10 Note that when the production of more than two commodities is considered, in general there will be 
no level of r that will allow the coexistence of all sectors. On this point, see Steedman (1999, p. 272) 
and Baldone (2001). 
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The outer envelope of the curve (black line of the right-hand side of Figure 1) 
illustrates the economically relevant (E/w)-r configuration. Formally, this relation-
ship is represented by the following condition:
E/W    =   !!! !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !! !!
!!!!!!!!!"!!!!!!!!! ! !!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! !
   [13]
From conditions [10] and [11] it can be seen that, given the terms of trade, the 
size of the interval [0;
1+( ) = −ˆ
ˆ
*
*
*
*
r
p
kp
p
kp
l
l
r
I
K
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K
I
C
] (the range of full specialization in I) will be smaller the 
higher is i) the import coefficient of the industrial sector (k) and ii) the higher the 
labor productivity of the primary sector vis-à-vis labour productivity in the indus-
trial sector. On the other hand, given technical conditions, this range will be small-
er the higher are the terms of trade in favour of the primary sector. (Notice inci-
dentally that, if condition [11] does not hold, then 
1+( ) = −ˆ
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 ≤ 0. This means that there will 
be no positive value of the rate of profits that would induce the economy to fully 
specialize in the production of the industrial good.) For latin American countries 
in recent decades, these conditions suggest that, if any, the interval [0;
1+( ) = −ˆ
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] will be 
small, and hence, without protection the economy will fully specialize in the pro-
duction of commodity c. In fact, this is the kind of productive structure envisaged 
by ND authors, and can be easily represented in terms of our model if, given 
the rate of profits, E (the “market exchange rate”, as the ND authors call it), is 
en dogenously determined by the “lower branch” of condition [13], i.e., at the 
level E = EC. This is how the last degree of freedom is eliminated. Then, equa-
tions [1]-[2]-[3]-[4]-[5]-[6]-[13] are enough to determine the following variables: 
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We finish this section with the following remark: while the NDP assumes a plau-
sible productive structure for lA countries, the proponents of this approach seem to 
conceive this configuration as a purely technical aspect of the economies under consid-
eration, while our framework has revealed that this outcome will generally depend on 
income distribution (except under the special case in which 
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). In other words, ND 
authors believe that it is always the case that
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, while it is perfectly conceivable 
that the condition
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0 0  holds, and hence, since in this case EI < EC, it is convenient 
for the economy to specialize in the production of industrial goods.
“RIcARDIAN RENTS” IN ThE BASIc FRAMEWORK
At this point of the exposition we should note that the inverse relationship be-
tween r and w/E that emerges from the canonical model is modified once we recall 
that, according to the NDP, good c is produced by employing a fixed factor whose 
exploitation under “conditions of extraordinary productivity” allows the sector to 
earn “Ricardian rents” (Bresser-Pereira, 2008, p. 50). If we assume full employment 
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of the fixed factor11, these rents will not be eliminated by the action of competition, 
and they will eventually be appropriated by the owners of the respective natural re-
sources. The magnitude of this unitary rent (p) is determined by:
! ! !!!! ! !!!!!!!  [14]
The most relevant implication in terms of the basic model is that it is now 
possible to fix the exchange rate independently of the value of the rate of profits. 
Put it differently, it is now possible to set both r (by its international level) and w/E 
exogenously, being the rent the endogenous distributive variable of the system12. 
Within this modified framework, there is a linear inverse relationship between the 
magnitude of rent in terms of commodity C (pC) and the real wage measured in 
terms of this commodity (w
w
EpC C
=
* ). This new definition of the real w age will prove 
useful in the fifth and sixth sections since, unlike the industrial good, commodity 
c can be seen as a necessary consumption good (“food”), and hence will play a 
central role when we address the potential distributive limits of devaluation policy. 
If we divide equation [14] by 
w w
EpC C
=
*  we obtain: 
!! ! !! !! !!!!! !!   [15]
Figure 2 illustrates this relationship.
Figure 2: Rent And Wages
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11 It is not necessary to assume the full employment of the whole stock of land. It is sufficient to assume 
that the land of “best quality” is fully employed. For our purposes, however, it is enough to assume that 
land is homogeneous and fully employed. 
12 This does not imply denying the possibility of a direct relationship between E and r. But such 
relationship will lack the same degree of generality that would be observed in the absence of rent. For 
instance, one could assume in a rather ad-hoc way that devaluation expectations can influence the level 
of the rate of profits. In this case, the equation that connects the domestic rate of profits with the 
international rate should adopt the following alternative form: r = r*+ µ (E). Where not only does µ (E) 
represent the specific risks of investing in the domestic economy, but it is also postulated that those risks 
increase with E, given the potential positive effect of devaluation on the perceptions on the future 
evolution of the exchange rate. That is, µ'(E) > 0. It is clear, anyway, that being based on purely 
subjective elements, and thus, subject to the influence of a potentially infinite variety of factors, this 
relationship lacks general validity. It is conceivable, in fact, that µ’(E) < 0. 
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The rent is maximum when wC is zero, and it disappears when the real wage 
is the highest compatible with the existence of sector c at the level r*, which occurs 
when E = EC.
Before stressing the second implication, notice that since EI >EC (or equiva-
lently, r* > 
1+( ) = −ˆ
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), at the level E = EC commodity I cannot be profitably produced when 
its international price is 
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> ). Therefore, its production can only 
be sold in the domestic market, provided that there exists some kind of extra-
economic measure that forbids imports of competing goods from abroad and/or 
tariffs that increase the selling price of the foreign commodity13. Then, the second 
implication is that the additional degree of freedom of the price system allows set-
ting the exchange rate at the level EI to allow the international competitiveness of 
the industrial sector. Formally, this means that E is determined at the level EI in 
[13], while sector c earns a persistent extraordinary rent per unit of output. We 
thus have 8 equations ([1]-[2]-[3]-[4]-[5]-[6]-[13]-[14]) in the following variables:
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>ThE lEvEl OF ThE EXchANGE RATE AND ThE BEhAvIOUR OF ThE 
cURRENT AccOUNT
In our basic framework, the level of E that the economy tends to realize, the 
“market rate” as Bresser-Pereira calls it, is the outcome of a problem of technical 
choices. In the absence of rents, given the rate of profits and the relevant conditions 
of production, we have argued that it was plausible to assume that this level would 
gravitate around EC for latin American countries (see conditions [10] and [11] in 
the second section). While it could be set at higher levels (including the level EI) 
when differential rents were considered (third section). For ND authors, on the 
contrary, in these economies the action of market forces causes the effective ex-
change rate to necessarily gravitate around the level EC. The reason is that this is 
the only level that ensures the equilibrium of the current account: “The ‘current’ 
equilibrium exchange rate [is] the one that balances intertemporally a country’s 
current account and that is therefore also the market rate, the rate on which the 
market shall converge.” (Bresser-Pereira, 2008, p. 53). 
We should note at this point that the previous claim combines three different 
statements: The first two are rather straightforward: a) that the minimum level of 
the exchange rate that ensures viability of sector c, EC, is also the level that ensures 
current account equilibrium, say EEq; b) that neither current account deficits nor 
surpluses can be sustained in the long run. And finally, c) it is also implicitly argued 
that the balance of payments can be brought into equilibrium only by adjustments 
in income distribution (in the w/E ratio). 
13 In formal terms, the tariff ( ) *θ θE p pC I I
S1+( ) = is endogenously determined by the following condition:( ) *θ θE p pC I IS1+( ) = .
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To assess the validity of each of these three statements, let us suppose that the 
behaviour of the current account (cc) can be described by the following condition:
!! ! !!!!! ! !!!!! !
!
!!"!!!
!
!    [16]
Where XC is the level of exports of the primary good, assumed to be autono-
mous, and MI is the level of imports of commodity I, which in turn depends on the 
given level of public expenditures (G), and on private consumption (PC), which is 
a positive function of the real wage and, therefore, of the w/E ratio. For simplicity 
the equation abstracts from the flow of financial services. Notice moreover that it 
is implicitly assumed that the economy fully specializes in the production of C, 
while it imports all its consumption of commodity I. 
By setting CC = 0 in [16], we can derive all the possible w/E – G configurations 
that equilibrate the current account. This is shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Current Account Equilibrium
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The curve is negatively sloped since a rise in the real wage increases PC and 
hence imports. For a given level of exports, equilibrium in the current account needs 
a decrease in the level of G. To the right (left) of CC = 0, the economy is in a situ-
ation of external deficit (surplus) since for a given real wage, the level of public 
expenditure is too high (low). 
We are now in position to assess whether the abovementioned statements a), b) 
and c) hold or not. To assess claim a), notice that if we fix the level of G at G
– 
in 
Figure 3, there is a corresponding level of E = EEq that, given money wages, equili-
brates the external sector. And there is no reason why EEq should be equal to EC, since 
the latter solves equation [8], while the former is the solution of CC(w/E,G) = 0. The 
coincidence between EC and EEqwill therefore occur only by a fluke. And this denies 
the first statement. 
let us consider statement b), namely whether surpluses or deficits in the cur-
rent account are sustainable when, given G = G
–
, the effective rate that emerges from 
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the problem of technical choices, say E = E
–
 (≥ EC), differs from EEq. In other words, 
is it the case that, if E
–
 ≠ EEq, the effective exchange rate will adjust to EEq? The 
answer needs distinguishing between situations of surpluses and deficits. The NDP 
argues that a foreign exchange surplus cannot last because there will be a tendency 
to appreciation of the domestic currency. The argument, however, seems to forget 
the possibility of quantity adjustments in the market of foreign exchange; in other 
words, through the working of “compensation mechanisms”, either by a central-
Bank policy of international reserve accumulation, or by private hoarding of foreign 
currency, as argued by many scholars of the Post Keynesian School (see lavoie 
2001; Frenkel, 2004)14.
It is clear, on the other hand, that persistent situations of current account 
deficits are not sustainable since they would imply an explosive dynamics of the 
country’s external debt15. Therefore, if the level of G does not change, there will be 
a tendency towards depreciation, at least up to the level EEq. 
Finally, with respect to statement c), it can be immediately noticed that given 
an initial situation of current account surplus or deficit, if equilibrium in the exter-
nal sector is to be re-established, this can occur either by a change in the w/E ratio – 
as is argued by NDP – or in the level of G (or through a combination of both). 
Therefore, the necessary connection between income distribution and the balance 
of payments adduced by the NDP is lost once we admit the possibility of adjust-
ments in the autonomous components of effective demand16. hence, statement c) 
is not generally valid.
Several conclusions emerge from the analysis. While it is still true that the level 
of E that the economy tends to realize emerges from the technical-choice problem 
addressed in the second and third sections, this statement must be qualified in the 
following sense: E
–
 cannot be persistently lower than EEq. hence, if: EC > EEq, then: 
E
– 
≥ E
C
, while if: EEq > EC, then: E
– 
≥ EEq. All this can be summarized by saying that, 
to be persistent, the effective exchange rate must satisfy the following condition:
! ! !"# !! !!!"    [17]
In other words, EC and EEq must be seen as the minimum thresholds of the 
effective exchange rate E
–
.
14 While for Frenkel the sustainability of the external surplus depends on the central Bank’s decision 
to fix the exchange rate and the size of the intervention in the foreign exchange market vis-à-vis the 
practical limits of monetary sterilization, for lavoie, who follows the Post-Keynesian endogenous money 
doctrine, compensation mechanisms are endogenous in nature. We will not discuss here whether the 
compensations mechanisms are exogenous (Frenkel) or endogenous (lavoie). Our point is that there 
seems to be agreement among heterodox scholars that these mechanisms exist and are effective. 
15 We are of course assuming that the economy in question does not issue the currency that is 
internationally accepted as a means of payment.
16 This possibility is recognized, for instance, by latin American Structuralist authors, such as canitrot 
(1975).
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Second, notice that, if the condition EEq > EC holds, since by [17] E
–
 must be at 
least equal to EEq, it follows that there will be “Ricardian rents” even if the current 
account is in equilibrium, that is, if E
– 
= EEq. This feature does not arise within the 
NDP framework because E
C
 is arbitrarily argued to be equal to EEq, at least in the 
long run.
Finally, note that the previous two remarks hold for given levels of autono-
mous expenditures G and X (and terms of trade). conversely, once G or X are 
allowed to vary, there is an additional degree of freedom to achieve condition [17]. 
Then, for instance, if the effective rate is such that: EEq > E
– 
≥ EC, the reestablishment 
of condition [17] can be achieved by a decrease in G that reduces the correspond-
ing level of EEq (or by an increase in X, although this is beyond the control of the 
Government). This can be summarized by re-expressing condition [17] as:
! ! !"# !! !!!"!!!!!   [17’]
INDUSTRIAl EQUIlIBRIUM EXchANGE 
RATE AND DISTRIBUTIvE cONFlIcT
We have already shown that Ricardian rents introduce an additional degree of 
freedom that allow policy-makers to fix the level of the E/w ratio independently of 
the behaviour of the rate of profits, and therefore devaluation policy can be employed 
to promote the development of the industrial sector. For a given value of the rate of 
profits, the required (gross) rate of devaluation is determined by what Bresser-Pereira 
(2008, p. 55) calls the “severity of the Dutch Disease”17, dh, which is given by: 
dh
E
E
dh
l
l
p
p kp r
E w
p
I
C
I
C
C
I K
C
=
=
− + 
=
*
*
*
( )1
α
α
ω
    [18]
Then, dh is equal to: 
dh
E
E
dh
l
l
p
p kp r
E w
p
I
C
I
C
C
I K
C
=
=
− + 
=
*
*
*
( )1
α
α
ω
  [18’] 
For a given rate of profits and terms of trade, dh positively depends on the degree 
of structural heterogen eity of the economy, namely: a) the relatively low labour pro-
ductivity of sector I and b) the high import coefficients of this industry. From condi-
tions [10] and [11] (see the second section), both factors suggest that for latin Amer-
ican peripheral economies, dh, and therefore the required rate of devaluation, could 
be drastic. This implies that the target exchange rate, EI, may not be socially feasible.
To see this it may be useful to recall that there is a sort of hierarchy among 
commodities: the reason is that good c can be conceived as the only consumption 
17 The Dutch Disease problem will be discussed in the following section. 
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good of which a minimum amount, wa, is necessary for workers’ subsistence (“food 
for the cattle”). Given w = w–, it is possible to determine the maximum level of the 
exchange rate (Ea) that allows workers to buy that quantity c as:
dh
E
E
dh
l
l
p
p kp r
E w
p
I
C
I
C
C
I K
C
=
=
− + 
=
*
*
*
( )1
α
α
ω  [19]
The implication is the following: since EI = EC * dh, if structural heterogeneity, 
measured by dh, is severe enough, it may well happen that EI > Ea. As a result, the 
required rate of devaluation will be socially unviable, it will provoke full wage 
resistance, and will therefore neutralize the initial effects of the rise of the exchange 
rate on international competitiveness. 
All this forces us to redefine Figure 2 to incorporate the wage limit to devaluation.
Figure 4: Upper limit to devaluation
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In Figure 4, at the minimum necessary level of consumption, a, the maximum 
rent attainable is determined by equation [15] at the level: ρa = 1 – alC (1 + r). 
Since ω αC
C
C I C C
S
C C
w
Ep
E E E E E E p Ep E E
E E
= ∈   = ≅( ) < =
=
*
*;
I C
C
C
E
p
E
=
*
'
, we can also illustrate this limit in terms of an E-wc equi-
lateral hyperbola that shows how the level of the real wage changes when 
the nominal exchange rate varies.
Figure 5 shows the possible range of variations of the nominal effective ex-
change rate:
ω
αC
C
C I C C
S
C C
w
Ep
E E E E E E p Ep E E
E E
= ∈   = ≅( ) < =
=
*
*;
I C
C
C
E
p
E
=
*
'
 [20]
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Figure 5: E – wc Relationship And Upper Limit To Devaluation
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Its lower limit is EC, since below this level commodity c cannot be profitably 
produced; while its upper bound is given by Ea, since above this value workers are 
not able to consume the quantity a of c. Finally, the figure shows that, since Ea > 
EI, either the industrial sector does not earn the normal rate of profits or, alterna-
tively, workers are not able to consume the minimum amount of the necessary good. 
In the following section we will discuss how the problem manifests itself with-
in the New-Developmentalist framework, and its possible solutions. 
DUTch DISEASE AND ITS NEUTRAlIZATION
The NDP subordinates distributive conflict to the potential problem of “rep-
rimarization” of the productive structure, a phenomenon known in the literature 
as “Dutch Disease” (see corden and Neary, 1982). In general terms, the issue can 
be described as follows: consider an economy with significant industrial develop-
ment, in which differences in productivity across sectors are small. In other words, 
within the relevant interval for the rate of profits, the industrial and primary ex-
change rates are approximately equal:
ω
αC
C
C I C C
S
C C
w
Ep
E E E E E E p Ep E E
E E
= ∈   = ≅( ) < =
=
*
*;
I C
C
C
E
p
E
=
*
'
  [21]
Then, the argument follows, the discovery of a new natural resource allows 
exploiting c under particularly favourable conditions. This decreases c-supply 
price: 
ω
αC
C
C I C C
S
C C
w
Ep
E E E E E E p Ep E E
E E
= ∈   = ≅( ) < =
=
*
*;
I C
C
C
E
p
E
=
*
'
   [22] 
If we further assume that the higher productivity of c allows the sector to 
increase its exports level, a foreign exchange inflow will take place. If there are no 
“compensation mechanisms” (see the fourth section), this inflow will induce a ten-
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dency to the appreciation of the domestic currency towards the level ω αC
C
C I C C
S
C C
w
Ep
E E E E E E p Ep E E
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= ∈   = ≅( ) < =
=
*
*;
I C
C
C
E
p
E
=
*
'
18, now 
considerably lower than EI19. And this provokes, in the absence of protection, the 
disappearance of industry. The Dutch Disease is illustrated in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Dutch Disease
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According to the NDP, the “correct way” (Bresser-Pereira, 2012, p. 66) to solve 
the problem consists in implementing a tax (θ ) on c-production that increases the 
supply price of this commodity (p p
E
E
p E p
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) (or what Bresser-Pereira denominates its “nec-
essary price”), and therefore its demand price, by appropriately rising the level of 
EC. The new supply price is: 
p p
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 [23] 
From condition [23] it follows that the equality of demand and supply prices 
for c is now 
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, which means that the new (and higher) level of the 
exchange rate that satisfies this condition is: 
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The tax allows re-establishing condition [21], and hence the viability of the 
industrial sector. however, this solution is inflationary and it may therefore face a 
“major political obstacle”, since the real-wage fall in terms of tradable goods may 
tackle the resistance of the working class (Bresser-Pereira, 2008, p. 59).
18 In the light of our discussion of the third section about the relationship between the level EC and EEq, 
we will here assume that EC ≥ EEq and hence the effective exchange rate will gravitate around EC.
19 An analogous effect to the discovery of a natural resource may be obtained if initially both sectors 
are equally efficient (
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 takes place, allowing sector c to tolerate a lower 
exchange rate, 
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' . At the initial level of E, there will exist a foreign exchange inflow due to the price 
effect, which will push the exchange rate towards the level 
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There are several aspects of the Dutch Disease that are worth discussing. First, 
notice that when the problem manifests itself, the distributive conflict has already 
been solved, since the tax limits to counteract the pervasive effects of appreciation, 
and hence increases the level of exchange rate, and therefore reduces the real wage, 
only up to its initial value 
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, which by hypothesis was socially viable.
Note in any case that, at first sight, there seems to be no way to avoid the 
potential inflationary pressures associated with the neutralization of the disease by 
means of the tax. At closer inspection, however, this is the result of the assumptions 
underlying NDP’s framework, in which the only way to induce an increase in the 
level of the effective exchange rate is through an increase in the supply price of c, 
since the presence of differential rents in “equilibrium” is neglected. 
As we have already seen, on the contrary, the moment these rents are suffi-
ciently persistent, monetary authorities can manage the nominal exchange rate 
directly (without relying on the aid of a tax), even if the rate of profits is exoge-
nously given. Therefore, it is possible to eliminate the competitiveness gap of the 
industrial sector by raising E up to its initial level 
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. like the tax on production 
costs, this policy alone is inflationary too. In this case, however, it limits itself to 
increase the demand price of c, but does not alter its supply price (in other words, 
the original value of EC does not change), and therefore its inflationary effect on 
the necessary good c can be avoided. To achieve this goal, it is enough that, at the 
same time, the Government imposes a tax on exports (t) that fixes the exchange 
rate net of taxes faced by c at the lower level 
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. This is none other than a 
compensated devaluation policy, or effective exchange rate differentiation, endorsed 
by several old latin American Structuralist scholars, the Argentinean economist 
Marcelo Diamand (1972) among them20. 
To see how this works, let us recall that Ea is the maximum level of the ex-
change rate tolerable by workers, and further assume that 
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, which 
means that the gross rate of devaluation required by the industrial sector, dh = 
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, 
cannot be implemented. In this context, an exchange-rate-differentiation policy 
absorbs a portion of the differential rent appropriated by landowners after devalu-
ation and prevents the demand price of c from raising to the same extent as dh. If 
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, the effective exchange rate faced by sector c will be: 
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. Then, 
at E = EI workers are now able to consume the minimum amount (a) of 
the necessary good, since:
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This is shown in Figure 7 by means of the E-wC equilateral hyperbola introduced 
in the fifth section. An export duty of magnitude t shifts the curve upwards (dotted 
line), and allows a higher real wage for each level of E. Moreover, the effective ex-
20 See Dvoskin and Feldman (2015) for a formal reconstruction of Diamand’s thought. 
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change rate for the industrial sector is equal to EI, while the one faced by sector c 
is Ea.
Figure 7: Exchange rate differentiation
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Then, if we depart from a situation in which 
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= − = − =1 (point A), devaluation 
from EC to EI causes a fall of wC, but, thanks to exchange rate differentiation, the 
distributive limit has not been surpassed (point c), as it would have occurred with 
a standard devaluation (point B). Finally, notice that the inflationary pressures 
could be fully neutralized if the Government sets 
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= − = − =1 , since in this case the 
maximum rate of c-consumption, wC, will remain at its initial level.
cONclUDING REMARKS
The present paper has attempted to reconstruct the New-Developmentalist 
approach, by means of a formal framework that endogenizes the productive struc-
ture of a small-open-peripheral economy, as the outcome of a problem of technical 
choices. This framework allowed us to inspect the conditions that the exchange 
rate must satisfy to ensure the viability of the industrial sector while simultane-
ously respecting the restrictions imposed by the balance of payments and the dis-
tributive conflict. Once differential rents are admitted, we have shown that export 
duties are a more efficient tool to neutralize the Dutch Disease than the imposition 
of a tax on the primary sector production costs, since the former extracts rents from 
the owners of natural resources without necessary increasing the domestic price 
faced by workers. At this juncture, one must stress, however, that distributive con-
flict may also emerge from the resistance of rentiers who may exert sufficient po-
litical power to hinder the policy of exchange rate differentiation. 
If in the light of our framework we now return to the more general discussion 
about the role of the exchange rate as a tool for sustained economic growth, one 
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should warn that setting the exchange rate at the industrial equilibrium level seems 
to be a necessary yet not a sufficient condition for industrial development. In par-
ticular, once the viability of the sector is ensured, the rise of exports will depend on 
the “extent of the market”, i.e., on the evolution of global effective demand. And 
given this level, it is clear that the industrial exports of a particular economy can 
increase only to the extent that there is a simultaneous fall in the level of exports 
of her competitors, and this will imply “exporting unemployment” to her trade 
partners21. Thus, one should expect that in response to devaluation in the domestic 
economy, competitors devalue their own currencies as well, thereby starting a cur-
rency war that ends up in a zero-sum game. 
At the global level, on the other hand, we should also expect that if a significant 
group of nations simultaneously devalue their currencies to promote exports, the 
growth rate of global output decelerates, due to the negative influence that the ex-
change rate exerts on the real wage. And this effect will tend to diminish the level 
of exports of all the economies involved in trade. It could be therefore concluded 
that exchange rate policy seems to be more effective to counteract negative shocks, 
such as devaluations pursed by trade partners or the tendency towards reprimariza-
tion, than as an effective tool for economic development.
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